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WHAT CONGRESS SAID ABOUT THE HEIGHTENED
PLEADING STANDARD: A PROPOSED SOLUTION
TO THE SECURITIES FRAUD
PLEADING CONFUSION
PatriciaJ. Meyer*
INTRODUCTION

In courtroom one, a plaintiff files suit against Company X, a company in which she had invested a substantial amount of her savings.
She lost a large amount of that money because X made its financial
picture look promising when, in reality, the company was suffering
financial difficulties. The plaintiff had been looking for a good investment, and through research, she had found the financial statements of
and several articles about Company X in which its managers had forecasted a brilliant future for the company. Despite these rosy representations, Company X was financially distressed and had issued
inflated reports in an attempt to gain the capital necessary to solve its
production problems. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the false and
misleading statements that Company X made led to the loss of her
hard-saved money.
In courtroom two, a "hired" plaintiff recovers a large sum of money
from a budding technology firm after she has filed a "cookie cutter"
complaint and threatened to engage in a drawn-out securities fraud
suit.' The lawyer for the plaintiff knew that the technology company
would settle. To get into court and coerce the company into settling,
the plaintiff simply had to plead that the company had the motive and
opportunity to profit by a false, public statement they issued. The
plaintiff knew that the company would pay because the discovery process necessary to prove the alleged statement was not false, and that
the plaintiff was bringing a frivolous suit, would cost much more than
a quick settlement.
Congress attempted to strike a balance between meritorious suits,
exemplified by the first case, and frivolous suits, typified by the second
case, by redefining the pleading standard for private securities fraud
suits. Congress wanted to allow real suits into court, while protecting
* I would like to dedicate this Note to my grandparents.
1. This type of suit is known as a strike suit. "Strike lawsuits are lawsuits filed by
class action attorneys on behalf of shareholders whose once attractive stock purchases
have failed to live up to their expectations." Joel Seligman, The Private Securities
Reform Act of 1995, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 717, 721 (1996) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-50,
pt. J, at 15 (1995)). Strike complaints are "often supported only by the hope that
broad-ranging discovery will provide sufficient evidence to survive a motion to dismiss or that the enormous cost of defending such suits will coerce a quick settlement."
Pamela J. Roberts & Patrick L. Ridinger, The PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995: Reform or Fiction, S.C. Law., Feb. 9, 1998, at 41, available in WESTLAW, 9
Feb SCLAW 41.
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businesses from "strike" suits that are easily filed by professional
plaintiffs. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("PSLRA") 2 represents Congress' attempt to resolve the conflict between the above two scenarios-between the true fraud victim plaintiff and the professional plaintiff.3 In an attempt to strike a balance
between meritorious and frivolous suits, Congress standardized the
pleading requirements for section 10(b) actions under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act ("Exchange Act").4 The goal of this legislation was
to establish a clear pleading standard to resolve the existing circuit
split regarding the correct application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) to securities fraud cases.5 Unfortunately, the new legislation
has only caused further confusion among plaintiffs and courts alike,
creating multiple pleading standards and, consequently, inconsistent
rulings. The result of the PSLRA has been still more confusion as to
the appropriate standard. There are three different interpretations of

the PSLRA's standard currently in the federal courts;6 two in the

2. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (amending the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77a et seq. and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.).
3. Congress cited four abuses targeted by the PSLRA:
(1) The routine filing of lawsuits following a significant stock decline without
regard to the issuer's culpability and "with only faint hope" that discovery
would lead to a "plausible cause of action";
(2) The targeting of "deep pocket defendants" without regard to their
culpability;
(3) Discovery practices that impose burdensome costs upon defendants and
make it "economical" for them to settle; and
(4) The "manipulation" by class action lawyers of the persons they purport
to represent.
Bruce G. Vanyo et al., The PleadingStandard of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in Securities Litigation 1997, at 71, 73 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course
Handbook Series No. B4-7199, 1997) (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730), available in WESTLAW, 1015 PLI/
Corp 71.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). The pleading requirement was standardized, specifically, through section 21D(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-4(b)(2) (1995).
5. See infra Part I.B. Securities fraud claims are usually brought under section
10(b) of the Exchange Act. Under 10(b), the SEC is given the power to promulgate
rules to enforce the federal securities laws. Rule 10b-5 is one such rule. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1997); see infra text accompanying notes 10-11.
6. See, e.g., In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 241-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(finding that the PSLRA does not change the substantive nature of scienter, but does
expressly heighten the pleading standard for securities fraud cases); Rehm v. Eagle
Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1253 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (concluding "that a reading of
§ 78u-4(b)(2) that adopts a scienter pleading standard equivalent to the Second Circuit rule best comports with the language, history, and purpose of the PSLRA"); In re
Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 25, 1996) ("Congress did not intend to codify the Second Circuit standard under
the [PSLRA]."). The three lines of cases will be discussed in depth in part II.C. of this
Note.
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Second Circuit alone.7
This Note analyzes the three prevailing interpretations of the standards for pleading and proving scienter under the PSLRA. Part I discusses how the 1934 Securities Exchange Act was previously applied
by the federal courts, highlighting the different pleading standards
that the Second and Ninth Circuits applied to section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 cases. Part II details the passage of the 1995 PSLRA, which was
designed to rectify the ambiguity in the old statute that led to the conflicting views of the Ninth and Second Circuits. Specifically. part II
describes the legislative history of the PSLRA with an eye toward discerning Congress's intent with respect to the new pleading standard.
Finally, part II documents the three divergent views of the PSLRA's
pleading standard to demonstrate the PSLRA's ambiguity. Part III
then argues that the PSLRA heightened the pleading requirement for
scienter beyond the strict standard previously endorsed by the Second
Circuit, but did not go so far as to make a substantive change in the
meaning of scienter. Part III further argues that because the prior
Second Circuit standard for pleading struck the correct balance between meritorious and frivolous plaintiffs, Congress should amend the
PSLRA to adopt it.
I.

REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIVATE SECURITIES FRAUD CASES:

SECTION 10(B) AND RULE 1OB-5 CLAtrs
Congress passed the 1934 Securities Exchange Act during
Depression "to promote investor confidence in the United
curities markets and thereby to encourage the investment
for capital formation, economic growth, and job creation."'

the Great
States senecessary
Congress

was particularly concerned about the "flagrant betrayal of ...

fiduci-

ary duties by directors and officers of corporations" in securities transactions.9 Therefore, to protect investors from these abuses, Congress
drafted legislation that put a check on corporate management.
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful for any person
"[tlo use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security ...

any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in

contravention of such rules and regulation as the [Securities and Exchange Commission] may prescribe...."0 Section 10(b) delegated to
the SEC, as part of its authority to enforce the federal securities laws
in general, the authority to promulgate rules to enforce the Exchange
7. Compare Baesa, 969 F. Supp. at 241-42, with Pilarczyk v. Morrison Knudsen
Corp., 965 F. Supp. 311, 320 n.8 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that the PSLRA merely
adopts the stringent pleading standard of the Second Circuit).
8. S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683.
9. Arnold S. Jacobs, An Analysis of Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 32 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 209, 209 & n.4 (1987) (quoting S. Rep. No. 73-1455. at 55

(1934)).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
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Act. Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful "[t]o make any untrue statement
of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading. . . ."I' For a plaintiff to bring

a successful 10b-5 claim, she must allege both reliance on a material
misstatement and scienter, or that such misrepresentation was made
knowingly." The next part of this Note undertakes an explanation of
the scienter requirement for 10b-5 actions.
A.

The Substantive Requirements of Scienter

Scienter is a necessary element in all 10b-5 claims. 3 The Supreme

Court, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 4 defined scienter as the

"mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. 5
The requirement of proving scienter placed "a burden on the plaintiff
to prove that the 'defendants either knew the misleading nature of
their statements, or made the statements in reckless disregard of adverse facts that could have been disclosed without extraordinary effort."' ' 6 Plaintiff's burden can be satisfied by clear evidence of intent
to deceive.17 While proof of intentional acts of deception clearly fulfill
the scienter requirement, 18 some cases presented the question of
whether reckless conduct by corporate officers when issuing securities
would likewise fulfill the scienter requirement.

9

The first case to find

that reckless conduct might constitute scienter appeared in a district
11. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
12. See Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 506-07 (9th Cir. 1992).
13. Id. at 507.
14. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
15. Id. at 193 n.12.
16. Edward J. Yodowitz & Robert S. Matlin, An Introduction to the "State of
Mind" Requirement As An Element Of Certain Claims and Defenses Arising Under
the Federal Securities Laws, in Securities Litigation 1989, at 383, 390 (PLI Litig. &
Admin. Prac. Course Handbook Series No. H4-5074, 1989), available in WESTLAW,
378 PLI/Lit 383 (quoting In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 672 F. Supp. 1552, 1573
(N.D. Cal. 1987)).
17. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193.
18. See id.
19. Note that the Supreme Court chose not to answer the question of whether
recklessness sufficed to meet the scienter standard in Hochfelder. Id. at 193 n.12. In
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., the Supreme
Court ruled out claims for aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b). 511 U.S.
164, 183 (1994).
[Tihe Court held that there can be no claim for aiding and abetting under
§ 10(b), reasoning that there is nothing in the statutory text which explicitly
provides for secondary liability. Similarly, defendants have argued that a
strict reading of § 10(b) precludes liability for anything other than knowing
or intentional conduct.
Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, The Scienter Requirement Under Section 10(b),
N.Y. L.J., Nov. 16, 1995, at 5.
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court in Oklahoma in 1976.20 In 1977, the Seventh Circuit then

a recklessness standard in Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical
adopted
2
Corp.

1

The Sundstrand court defined recklessness as:
a highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or
even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so
obvious that the actor must have been aware of it. 2
Since the Sundstrand case, over half of the appellate circuits found
that this standard of recklessness constitutes scienter in 10(b) and lOb5 cases.' Every circuit that had addressed the issue of recklessness
prior to the PSLRA agreed that recklessness would suffice to meet the
scienter definition.2 4 Consequently, prior to the PSLRA, scienter
20. Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla.
1976) (noting that "obvious risk of harm could be substituted for guilty knowledge" in
10b-5 cases but not under the present facts), vacated sub. non., Cronin v. Midwestern
Okla. Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1980).
21. 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977).
22. Id. at 1045 (quoting Franke, 428 F. Supp. at 725).
23. See SEC v. Carriba Air, Inc., 681 F.2d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 1982); Hackbart v.
Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1118 (10th Cir. 1982): Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d
929, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d
Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1025 (6th Cir. 1979):
Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692 (1st Cir. 1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon &
Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1978).
24. See Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp.. 914 F.2d 1564, 1570 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that reckless conduct that is "highly unreasonable" and "represents 'an extreme
departure from the standards of ordinary care... to the extent that the ... defendant
must have been aware of it' (quoting Rolf, 570 F.2d at 47)); In re Phillips Petroleum
Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989) (adopting the Sndstrand definition for
scienter); Woods v. Barnett Bank of Fort Lauderdale, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 (11th Cir.
1985) (noting that "severe recklessness," defined as "an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care," constituted scienter (quoting Broad, 642 F.2d at 961-61));
Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 844 & n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating that recklessness
would be enough to constitute scienter), rev'd on other grounds,463 U.S. 646 (1983);
Hackbart, 675 F.2d at 1117-18 (expressly recognizing that reckless behavior which is
"an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care" constitutes scienter);
Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 783 (8th Cir. 1981) (noting that at the very least,
"gross" recklessness will suffice as scienter); Broad, 642 F.2d at 961-62 (noting that
"severe recklessness" constitutes scienter): Mansbach. 598 F.2d at 1023 (expressly
holding that "recklessness is a sufficiently culpable state of mind for liability under
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5"); Cook, 573 F.2d at 692 (stating that reckless conduct "comes
closer to being a lesser form of intent than merely a greater degree of ordinary negligence" (quoting Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977));
Rolf, 570 F.2d at 47 (noting that recklessness is enough to meet the scienter requirement). The Fourth Circuit has not explicitly found that recklessness fulfills the scienter requirement, but district courts in the circuit have so held. See In re EPIC
Mortgage Ins. Litig., 701 F. Supp. 1192, 1250 (E.D. Va. 1988) (noting that recklessness
constitutes scienter), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub. norm., Foremost
Guar. Corp. v. Meritor Say. Bank, 910 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1990).
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under the 1934 Exchange Act consisted of both reckless and intentional misrepresentation.
B.

The PleadingRequirements of 10b-5 Fraud Cases

Generally speaking, in a civil case, a plaintiff is only required to file
a short and plain statement to set forth a claim for relief.26 When
pleading fraud, however, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide
a higher pleading standard. 2 Rule 9(b) states that "[i]n all averments
25. While almost all the circuits have accepted that recklessness fulfills the scienter requirement, see supra note 23, there is much debate regarding what constitutes
reckless conduct. The application of the Sundstrand standard has been far from uniform. For example:
[]In action brought by shareholder and class against foreign corporation, alleging, inter alia, that corporation had willfully engaged in a scheme to defraud plaintiffs in violation of both the Act and Rule 10b-5... if defendant
had acted as plaintiff alleged-for purpose of perpetuating control of incumbent board-and if corporation's actions had caused artificial value to be
placed on stock-court would conclude that defendant had acted with reckless disregard for effect of actions on market, giving rise to § 10(b) violation.
Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, What Constitutes Recklessness Sufficient to Show Necessary Element of Scienter in Civil Action for Damages Under § 10(b) of Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. §78j(b)) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act, 49 A.L.R. Fed. 392, Supp. 18-19 (Supp. 1997) (citing Jordan v. Global
Natural Resources, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 59 (S.D. Ohio 1983)). A defendant was also
said to have acted with sufficient recklessness to satisfy the scienter requirement
where he encouraged plaintiff to invest in tire business on 50 percent-50 percent basis, then on 51 percent-49 percent basis when defendant insisted on
maintaining control, but later, on advice of counsel, changed terms of deal
without telling plaintiff, so that plaintiff was not issued common stock but
nonparticipating preferred stock ....
Id. at 19 (citing Hackbart 675 F.2d at 1114). According to the Southern District of
New York, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976), only requires an
allegation of intentional conduct beyond mere negligence for a 10b-5 claim; thus, the
court concluded that the allegation that the defendants "knew" of the falsity of their
representations or "should have known" was a sufficient allegation of scienter. Gross
v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 431 F. Supp. 1080, 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
There exists, then, a wide spectrum of acts constituting recklessness. Simple negligence represents the floor of the spectrum-acts of simple negligence alone do not
qualify as scienter. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 201 (1976) (finding that "§ 10(b) was addressed to practices that involve some element of scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for negligent conduct alone"). Other courts have held recklessness to
mean an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care. See Franke, 428 F.
Supp. at 725. Recklessness has also been described as "closely approach[ing] ...
conscious deception." Coleco Indus. v. Berman, 423 F. Supp. 275, 296 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
Another court has recognized recklessness as "com[ing] closer to being a lesser form
of intent than merely a greater degree of ordinary negligence." Hoffman v. Estabrook
& Co., 587 F.2d 509, 516 (1st Cir. 1978) (quoting Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554
F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977)). Consequently, prior to the PSLRA, scienter was well
established as an element of 10(b) and lOb-5 claims. Intentional misrepresentations
clearly satisfied the scienter requirement. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 201. While reckless
conduct could constitute scienter, the specific acts of recklessness that constituted scienter. however, were still subject to debate.

26. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
27. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
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of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake
shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge and other
condition of mind of a person may be averred generally."'
Circuit
courts have held that Rule 9(b) applies to 10(b) and lOb-5 claims. 29
To state a 10b-5 cause of action, a plaintiff was required to plead
three things: (1) that the defendant made a false statement or omitted
a material fact; (2) that the act was done with scienter; and (3) that
plaintiff's reliance on defendant's action caused plaintiff injury."
Pleading the first and third prongs of the requirement usually caused

little difficulty for the plaintiff. The pleading of scienter, however,
presented questions for the plaintiff.
Under the pre-PSLRA Exchange Act, the circuits were split as to
how Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)'s "stated with particularity" requirement
meshed with the 10b-5 actions' pleading requirements. For example,
Rule 9(b) is not met if a complaint vaguely attributes fraudulent statements to a defendant. 3 ' Congress left it to the courts to determine the

specificity of facts needed to meet the Rule 9(b) standard in a lOb-5
action. A split regarding the stringency of the pleading standard de-

veloped at the circuit court level. The split centered around a lenient
Ninth Circuit interpretation32 and a stringent Second Circuit interpretation of the pleading requirement.33 While neither circuit, consistent
with Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), accepted a "bare bones complaint," and both
required "plead[ing of] additional facts before allowing a suit alleging
28. Id
29. See In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1545 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc)
(finding "implicitly or explicitly, that [Fed. R. Civ. P.] Rule 9(b) applies to actions
brought under the federal securities laws"); Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545,
556 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that "[a] plaintiff unable to allege those specific facts necessary under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) which would raise a strong inference of scienter...
would not be able to establish a prina facie case under § 10(b)").
30. See In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 264 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing
Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1985));
see also Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1250-51 (N.D. Il. 1997) (quoting
Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1331 (7th Cir. 1995)):
To state a valid Rule lob-5 claim, "a plaintiff must allege that the defendant:
1) made a misstatement or omission, 2) of material fact, 3) with scienter, 4)
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, 5) upon which the
plaintiff relied, and 6) that reliance proximately caused the plaintiff's injury."
31. E.g., Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1175 (2d Cir. 1993) (explaining that to meet the Rule 9(b) requirements a complaint must specify the fraudulent
statements, who said them, and when, where, and why they were said); DiLeo v.Ernst
& Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) (same).
32. GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1541; see Marksman Partners, LP. v. Chantal Pharm.
Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1309 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (noting that the PSLRA "leaves little
doubt.., that the lenient GlenFed standard can no longer be said to constitute the
sum of scienter pleading requirements" (emphasis added)).
33. Tune Warner, 9 F.3d at 265 (noting that, if courts use a less strict standard, they
will burden companies with the "expense of discovery or by a settlement extracted
under threat" even where the company was not at fault).
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open market fraud to proceed,"34 the two circuits fashioned different
standards for plaintiffs' pleadings. Plaintiffs in the Ninth and Second
Circuits had to plead securities fraud differently just to get their securities fraud claims into court.
The Ninth Circuit interpretation of the pleading requirement is best
illustrated by In re GlenFed, Inc. Securities Litigation.35 According to
GlenFed, the model for Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) is the English Rules of
Practice of 1937.36 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that courts must be
true to the English Rules to properly interpret the exact requirements
of Rule 9(b).37 Judge Fletcher, writing for the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, found that, "[w]e are not permitted to add new requirements
to Rule 9(b) simply because we like the effects of doing so.""3 In
other words, the majority found that, regardless of whether changing
the pleading standard would strike the proper balance between meritorious and strike plaintiffs, it was not the courts' place to make that
decision."

Thus, the Ninth Circuit's view was that the courts were

required to interpret Rule 9(b) as limiting what was required to plead
fraud, even if it had the undesirable effect of allowing too many frivolous suits.
Accordingly, to meet the Ninth Circuit pleading requirement, a
plaintiff could aver scienter generally-simply by saying that scienter
existed-because that is all Rule 9(b) explicitly required." The Ninth
Circuit later held that: "In a securities fraud action, a pleading is sufficient under Rule 9(b) if it identifies the circumstances of the alleged
fraud so that the defendant can prepare an adequate answer.""
Stated differently, the Ninth Circuit required that a statement made
by a plaintiff describe the circumstances which she believes constitute
fraud and a declaration that such actions constitute fraud.4 2
34. Elliot J. Weiss, The New Securities FraudPleading Requirement: Speed Bump
or Road Block?, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 675, 677-78 (1996).
35. 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
36. Id. at 1545 & n.4.
37. Id. Order 19, Rule 22 of the English Rules of Practice of 1937 stated: "Wherever it is material to allege malice, fraudulent intention, knowledge, or other condition of the mind of any person, it shall be sufficient to allege the same as a fact
without setting out the circumstances from which the same is to be inferred." Id. (cita-

tion omitted).
38. Id. at 1546 (noting that whether or not the Second Circuit test deters "strike
suits," the court can not merely adopt the test because it believes it weeds out such
suits).
39. Id.

40. Id. at 1546-47.
41. Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Kaplan v. Rose,
49 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Kaplan, 49 F.3d at 1370 (9th Cir. 1994)

(stating that "[t]he pleading must state precisely the time, place, and nature of the
misleading statements, misrepresentations, and specific acts of fraud").
42. GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1549.
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Contrary to the lenient Ninth Circuit standard, the Second Circuit
adopted a much stricter pleading standard.43 According to the Second
Circuit, scienter is a necessary element of every 10b-5 action, and
though it need not be plead with "great specificity,"" the facts alleged
in the complaint must "give[ ] rise to a 'strong inference' of fraudulent
intent."'4 5 The Second Circuit required that a plaintiff plead "those
events which they assert give rise to a strong inference that the defendants had knowledge of the facts... or recklessly disregarded their
existence." 4 In Beck v. ManufacturersHanover Trust Co.,47 the court
announced a test to notify plaintiffs
of what was necessary to plead a
"strong inference" of scienter48 A plaintiff could prove a "strong inference" by alleging facts establishing a motive to commit fraud and
an opportunity to do so.4 9 Alternatively, a plaintiff could allege facts

constituting circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior.5 If a plaintiff attempting to establish a "strong inference" of
scienter was unable to satisfy the motive and opportunity prong, "the
strength of [her]
circumstantial allegations [had to] be correspond51
ingly greater."
In an attempt to rectify the differences between the two opposing
circuit standards, Congress enacted section 21D(b) of the PSLRA. 5
With the PSLRA, Congress wanted to standardize pleading and properly balance frivolous and meritorious claims. Unfortunately, Congress's good intentions were thwarted by the statute's ambiguous
language. The next section analyzes the requirements of the PSLRA.
43. See In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1993).
Although Tune Warner was most often followed, there was also a second line of cases
in the Second Circuit that required an even higher standard for recklessness in 10(b)
cases than Tune Warner. See, e.g., In re Leslie Fay Cos. Sec. Litig., 871 F. Supp. 686,
692 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that for outside auditors "only behavior which is either
deliberate or so reckless that an inference of fraudulent intent might be dram by a
reasonable finder of fact" will constitute scienter).

44. Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Fluor Corp., 808 F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1070 (2d Cir. 1985)).

45. O'Brien v. Nat'l Property Analysts Partners, 936 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1991)
(quoting Wexner v. First Manhattan Co., 902 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1990)).
46. Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 558 (2d Cir. 1979).
47. 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987).

48. Id
49. In re Tune Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 269 (2d Cir. 1993). The Second
Circuit defined "motive and opportunity" in Shields v. Citytnrst Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d
1124 (2d Cir. 1994). "Motive would entail concrete benefits that could be realized by
one or more of the false statements and wrongful nondisclosures alleged. Opportunity would entail the means and likely prospect of achieving concrete benefits by the
means alleged." Id. at 1130.

50. Tune Warner, 9 F.3d at 269. Recklessness has been long recognized as sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement in every circuit that has addressed the issue.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
51. Beck, 820 F.2d at 50.
52. See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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THE RESCUE, OR NOT?

By 1993, it was evident that Congress needed to make changes in
the securities law, and as a result, Congress began the long process of
reforming the 1934 Exchange Act to eliminate the confusion over the
application of Rule 9(b) to securities fraud cases. 53 It was not- until
1995, however, that Congress passed the PSLRA.
The early 1995 legislation mirrored the prior attempts to reform the
Exchange Act.54 Each version of the legislation had the goal of ending the circuit split as to pleadings." In fact, in 1994, Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") Chairman Arthur Levitt testified before
Congress and requested that it "harmonize the differ[ent] [pleading]
standards applied by the circuit courts of appeals. ' '56 It was not until
the 104th Congress, however, with the bi-partisan backing of Senators
Christopher Dodd (D-CT) and Pete Domenici (R-NM) that Congress
was able to pass any reform legislation.
In each draft of the legislation, the issue of what constituted scienter
was in contention.57 And, as the Ninth Circuit noted, it was "a job for
Congress... in the process of amending the Federal Rules" to resolve
the conflict among the circuits and set forth a clear pleading standard
for plaintiffs to follow. 58 The quest for reform legislation that
culminated in the 1995 PSLRA was an attempt to take that action.
A. The Legislative History of the PSLRA
The legislative history of the PSLRA gives insight to the intent of
Congress in its passage of the PSLRA. To fully understand the final
Conference Committee version, it is important to look at the development of the statute in both the Senate and the House. The following
part reviews the history of the bill.
53. See Susan Antilla, A Battle Over Securities-FraudCases, N.Y. Times, July 4,
1993, at F13. Senator Dodd remarked during the veto override debate on the floor of
the Senate that, in fact, this legislation had been around since 1991. 141 Cong. Rec.
S19,065 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd). Moreover, "[s]ome 1600
days have passed since the legislation was first introduced" and "12 public congressional hearings on this bill" have been held. 141 Cong. Rec. S19,066 (daily ed. Dec. 21,
1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
54. See S. Res. 1976, 103d Cong., 140 Cong. Rec. S3704 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1994).
55. See infra Part II.C (examining the various drafts of the PSLRA).
56. Securities Litigation Reform: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Financeof the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103rd Cong. 38

(1994) (statement of Hon. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).

57. See infra Part II.A.
58. In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1546 (9th Cir. 1994); accord
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coord. Unit, 507 U.S. 163,
168 (1993) (finding that to heighten a pleading standard, Congress, and not the judici-

ary, must act).
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1. The House Version of the PSLRA
The PSLRA was first introduced on January 4, 1995, in the House
as Title II of H.R. 10.19 The original draft included changes to the
1934 Exchange Act in both the substantive requirement of scienter
and the pleading requirements.6' The draft added a section 1OA(a) to
the Exchange Act that required plaintiffs to plead that the defendant
made the fraudulent statement knowingly and recklessly." It also added a new section 1OA(b) to the Exchange Act, requiring a plaintiff to
plead with specificity facts demonstrating the state of mind of each
62
defendant at the time the statements were made.
Both the House Committee on Commerce and the Committee on
the Judiciary received the bill for consideration. 63 Throughout January and February of 1995, the Commerce Committee's Subcommittee
on Telecommunications and Finance held hearings on H.R. 10.1 The
Subcommittee called before it SEC representatives, corporate CEOs,
and investors.6 5 On February 10, 1995, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt
testified that the proposal to require plaintiffs to prove that defendants had actual knowledge that the statements defendants made were
false would be too difficult for many plaintiffs to do at the pre-discov59. See 141 Cong. Rec. H124 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995).
60. H.R. 10 stated in pertinent part:

Sec. 10A REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS:
(a)SCIENTER.-In any action under section 10(b), a defendant may be
held liable for money damages only on proof(1) that the defendant made an untrue statement of a material fact, or omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in light of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading; and
(2) that the defendant knew the statement was misleading at the time it was
made, or intentionally omitted to state a fact knowing that such omission
would render misleading the statements made at the time they were made.
(b)REQUIREMENT FOR EXPLICIT PLEADING AND PROOF OF
SCIENTER.- In any action under section 10(b) in which it is alleged that
the defendant(1) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(2) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading; the complaint shall allege specific facts demonstrating the state of
mind of each defendant at the time the alleged violation occurred. The complaint shall also specify each statement or omission alleged to have been
misleading and the reasons the statement or omission is misleading. If an
allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and
belief, the complaint shall set forth with specificity all information on which
that belief is formed. Failure to comply fully with this requirement shall result in dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
H.R. 10, 104th Cong. § 10 (1995).
61. Id. § 1OA(a).
62. Id § 10A(b).
63. 141 Cong. Rec. H124 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995).
64. Common Sense Legal Reform AcL" HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. On Commerce, 104' Cong. (1995)

[hereinafter House Hearings].
65. Id. at 39-237.
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ery stage. 66 Levitt also noted that the choice not to include recklessness on the part of large companies, in the definition of scienter,
concerned the SEC,67 primarily because the SEC did not want to see
substantive changes made in the meaning of scienter.6 s The agency
thought that "[l]iability for reckless misconduct was 'needed to protect
the integrity of the disclosure process which ... represents the integrity of the markets."' 69 As a result of the testimony, the subcommittee
amended H.R. 10 on February 14, 1995.70 The amended version continued to premise liability based both on recklessness and intentional
66. Id. at 191-221. In a hearing before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications
and Finance of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, Professor Arthur R. Miller
of Harvard University remarked that an identical 1994 proposal
seems to suggest that at the outset of a case, the plaintiff must have the
clearest proof of each individual defendant's state of mind. That is totally
unrealistic. It is only in the rarest of instances that this type of evidence
exists. It would be impossible [to plead this type of evidence] in the vast
majority of cases.
Securities Litigation Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Telecommunications
And Finance Of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103 Cong. 142 (1994)

(prepared statement of Arthur R. Miller, Bruce Bromley Professor of Law, Harvard
University Law School).
67. House Hearings, supra note 64, 201-02.

68. Id. As of April 6, 1998, the SEC was still concerned about the elimination of
recklessness as a form of scienter. SEC Chairman Endorses Class Action Reforms,

Nat'l L.J., Apr. 6, 1998, at A10. The SEC won a large concession from the Senate:
"In the event that federal court rulings ultimately wipe out recklessness as the minimum standard of intent in ...class actions, [two senators] have agreed to introduce

legislation to amend the 1995 law by codifying recklessness as the standard of intent."
Id.The two Senators who were ready to amend the legislation were two of the original authors of the PSLRA, Senators Dodd and D'Amato. Id.
69. William S. Lerach & Eric Alan Isaacson, Pleading Scienter Under Section
21D(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Motive, Opportunity, Recklessness,
and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 San Diego L. Rev. 893,

933-34 (1996) (second alteration in original) (quoting House Hearings,supra note 64).
Chairman Levitt said:
We really want corporations--we want executives of corporations-to worry
about the accuracy of their disclosures. It is the best way I know to assure
the markets of a continuous stream of reliable, accurate information. Any
higher scienter standard threatens the process that has made our markets
what they are. Indeed, an actual knowledge standard could create a legal
incentive to ignore indications of fraud. The phrase, "Ignorance is bliss,"
could take on, unhappily, new meaning.
House Hearings,supra note 64, at 194-95. He continued:
The Commission has consistently supported a recklessness standard because
such a standard is needed to protect the integrity of the disclosure process.
The law should sanction corporations and individuals who act recklessly
when making disclosures, because that is the only way to assure the markets
of a continuous stream of accurate information. Any higher scienter standard would lessen the incentives for corporations and other issuers to conduct a full inquiry into areas of potential exposure, and thus threaten the
process that has made our markets a model for nations around the world.
Id. at 202.
70. 141 Cong. Rec. D191 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 1995). The new text for Section
1OA(a) read as follows:
(a)SCIENTER.-
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deception. 7 It now required plaintiffs to "make specific allegations
which, if true, would be sufficient to establish scienter as to each de-

fendant at the time the alleged violation occurred."'P
While the Committee took the SEC's advice as to recklessness, the
SEC was still dissatisfied with the stringency of the pleading standard.
The following day, the SEC issued a press release concerning the
amended bill's pleading requirement and the reckless conduct stan-

dard.73 To plead scienter under the new House amendment, a plaintiff

would have to plead specific allegations which would "sufficient[ly]
(1) IN GENERAL.- In any private action arising under this title based on
a misstatement or omission of a material fact, liability may not be established unless the defendant possessed the intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud. The defendant may be found to have acted with such intent only on
proof that(A) the defendant directly or indirectly made a fraudulent statement:
(B) the defendant possessed the intention to deceive, manipulate, or defraud; and
(C) the defendant made such fraudulent statement knowingly or recklessly.
(2) FRAUDULENT STATEMENT.-For purposes of paragraph (1), a
fraudulent statement is a statement that contains an untrue statement of a
material fact, or omits a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances in which they were made, not
misleading.
(3) KNOWINGLY.-For purposes of paragraph (1). a defendant makes a
fraudulent statement knowingly if the defendant knew that the statement of
a material fact was misleading at the time it was made, or knew that an
omitted fact was necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading.
(4) RECKLESSNESS.-For purposes of paragraph (1). a defendant makes
a fraudulent statement recklessly if the defendant, in making such statement,
acted with willful blindness such that the defendant was consciously aware of
a high probability that the statement was false, and took deliberate actions in
order to avoid ascertaining its truth or falsity. A defendant who actually
believed the statement was true is not reckless.
Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 69, at 935-36 n.238 (quoting H.R. 10, Committee Print
§ 204 (Feb. 14, 1995) (emphasis added)).
71. The substitute provision on pleading scienter. for section 10A(b) read as
follows:
Section 1OA(b): (b) REQUIREMENT FOR EXPLICIT PLEADING AND
PROOF OF SCIENTER.-In any private action to which subsection (a) applies, the complaint shall specify each statement or omission alleged to have
ben [sic] misleading, and the reasons the statement or omission is misleading. The complaint shall also make specific allegations which, if true, would
be sufficient to establish scienter as to each defendant at the time the alleged
violation occurred. It shall not be sufficient for this purpose to plead the
mere presence of facts inconsistent with a statement or omission alleged to
have been misleading. If an allegation is made on information and belief,
the complaint shall set forth with specificity all information on which that
belief is formed.
Id. at 936 n.239 (quoting H.R. 10, Committee Print § 204 (Feb. 14, 1995)).
72. Id.
73. Statement by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Regarding H.R. 10
as amended on February 14, Securities and Exchange Commission News Release,
quoted in Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 69, 936 n.240 (Feb. 15, 1995) [hereinafter
SEC Release].
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establish" that the defendant acted knowingly or recklessly."4 Ac-

cording to the agency, the new "sufficient[ly] establish" standard

would place undue burden on plaintiffs. 75 The SEC pointed out that,

at that time, the most stringent formulation of the pleading requirements mandated that plaintiffs plead facts giving rise to a "strong inference" of fraudulent intent.7 6

Despite the SEC's concern, the amended H.R. 10 was reintroduced
on the House floor on February 27, 1995 as H.R. 1058. 77 Although
the report from the subcommittee ultimately contained the SEC's objection, the subcommittee declined to incorporate it into the legislation.7" Following some debate, an overwhelming majority of the
House-325 votes to 99 votes-passed H.R. 1058.79

2. The Senate Version of the PSLRA
On January 18, 1995, Senator Domenici introduced S.240, "Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995," to the Senate floor. s° S.
240 proposed a new section 39 to the Exchange Act, requiring plaintiffs to plead "specific facts" relating to the "state of mind" of each
defendant."1 The bill was sent to the Senate Committee on Banking,
74. See supra note 71.
75. See SEC Release, supra note 73. Levitt believed that the proposed provisions
did not strike a balance between meritorious and strike suits and would adversely
affect many investors. Id. The Commission disliked the new scienter standard in H.R.
10 because a plaintiff now had to "establish" that the defendant acted knowingly. The
SEC felt that this would rule out the prior Second Circuit motive and opportunity
test. Id.
76. Ross v. A. H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 558 (2d Cir. 1979); see also In re Time
Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 263-64 (2d. Cir. 1993) (following the "strong inference" standard).
77. See 141 Cong. Rec. H2306 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1995); see also H.R. 1058, 104th
Cong. (1995).
78. H.R. Rep. No. 104-50, at 42-45 (1995).
79. 141 Cong. Rec. H2863-64 (daily ed. March 8, 1995).
80. 141 Cong. Rec. S1075-S1084 (daily ed. Jan 18, 1995). This legislation was a bipartisan bill.
81. S.240, 104th Cong. § 39 (1995). The new section read as follows:
SEC. 39. REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITY FRAUD ACTIONS
(a) INTENT.- In an implied private action arising under this title in which
the plaintiff may recover money damages from a defendant only on proof
that the defendant acted with some level of intent, the plaintiff's complaint
shall allege specific facts demonstrating the state of mind of each defendant
at the time the alleged violation occurred.
(b) MISLEADING STATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS.- In an implied
action arising under this title in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant(1) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(2) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading; the plaintiff shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an
allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and
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Housing, 8and
Urban Affairs, where the Securities Subcommittee re2
viewed it.

The Subcommittee on Securities held hearings on S. 240 on March
2, March 22, and April 6, 1995.3 Again, among the many to testify

before the Committee was SEC Chairman Levitt.'

He came before

the subcommittee to ask the Senate to amend the legislation's provi-

sions relating to the pleading of scienter.as Chairman Levitt said: "I
would say that the standards for pleading a defendant's state of mind

should be conformed to the Second Circuit standard, that a plaintiff
plead with particularity facts that give rise to a strong inference [of
fraudulent intent]."' He felt that by codifying the Second Circuit
standard for pleading scienter, the goal of striking a balance between
real suits and frivolous suits would be realizedA1
The Senate Banking Committee, consequently, added the "strong
inference" standard of the Second Circuit to its legislation. 8 The
amended S. 240 added a new section 36 to the Exchange Act with
language that required a plaintiff to "specifically allege facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind."8 9 The Committee adopted the Second Circuit standard because its efficacy had been tested by the Second Circuit.' The
belief, the plaintiff shall set forth all information on which that belief is
formed.
Id.
82. 141 Cong. Rec. S1070 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995).
83. Securities Litigation Reform ProposalsS. 240, S.667 and H.R.1058: Hearings
Before the SubconnL on Sec of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Houts., and Urban
Affairs, 104th Cong. (1995).
84. Id. at 228-36, 247-57.
85. Id at 248-49.
86. Id. at 231.
87. Id. at 249.
88. Sec. 36 REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS.
(a) misleading statements and omissions.- In any private action arising under
this title in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant(1) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(2) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading; the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an
allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and
belief, the plaintiff shall set forth all information on which that belief is
formed.
(b) required state of mind.- In any private action arising under this title in
which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the plaintiffs complaint shall
with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this title, specifically
allege facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind.
S. 240, 104$ Cong. § 36 (1995) (emphasis added).
89. 141 Cong. Rec. S9171 (daily ed. June 27, 1995).
90. S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694.
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Committee noted, however, that it did not intend to codify the case
law that had been generated in the Second Circuit regarding this
standard. 91
The Banking Committee reported back to the full Senate in June of
1995.92 On the floor of the Senate, Senator Arlen Specter proposed
an amendment that he believed would clarify the "strong inference"
standard.93 His amendment essentially codified the test that the district courts of the Second Circuit had previously developed through
case law.9 4 He proposed that language almost mirroring the Second

Circuit test be added to the legislation:
(1)[A] strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind may be established either(A) by alleging facts to show that the defendant had both motive
and opportunity to commit fraud; or
(B) by alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness by the
defendant. 95

Senator Specter believed that this additional language in S.240 established guidelines for what would meet the strong inference pleading
requirement for scienter. 96 The opposition to the amendment expressed concerns that this amendment would expressly limit how a
plaintiff could successfully plead scienter. 97 Nevertheless, Senator
Specter's amendment passed, by a vote of 57 to 42, and became part
of S.240.98 Thus, the Senate version of the PSLRA essentially codified the Second Circuit standard.
3. The Conference Committee Report on the PSLRA
At the Conference Committee called to rectify the differences between the House and Senate versions of the PSLRA, the Committee
dropped Senator Specter's amendment from the proposed statute. 99
The Committee also changed the language of the pleading requirement from requiring a plaintiff to "specifically allege facts" to "state
91. Id.
92. 141 Cong. Rec. S8885-924, S8935-43 (daily ed. June 22, 1995).
93. 141 Cong. Rec. S9170-71 (daily ed. June 27, 1995).
94. Id.
95. 141 Cong. Rec. S9170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995).
96. 141 Cong. Rec. S9171 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter).
Senator Arlen Specter did not include in his amendment, however, the Second Circuit's holding that less particularity was required when plaintiffs could allege motive
and opportunity. 141 Cong. Rec. S9170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995); cf Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987) (discussing the Second Circuit's method for establishing a strong inference of scienter by showing motive and
opportunity).
97. 141 Cong. Rec. S9201 (daily ed. June 28, 1995) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
98. Id.
99. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
740.
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with particularity" facts which give rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind.c01 On November 28,

1995, the final Conference Committee report and the accompanying
Statement of Managers was submitted to both houses of Congress for
approval. 10 1
Senator Dodd, who served as a manager on the Conference Committee for the Senate, explained that there was no debate at the Conference on the changed wording in the pleading standard, because the
change came from the Judicial Committee. 10 2 The Judicial Committee
requested that the Conference Committee make a "change in the language of the statute.., to conform with the language of Rule 9(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs how attorneys
should draft fraud complaints."' 1 3 Critics of the bill were concerned,
however, about the Conference Committee's pleading standard. 104 In
particular, many focused on the Statement of Managers that reported
that the bill was not a codification of the Second Circuit standard but,
rather, a more stringent requirement.10 5 Despite these concerns, the
Conference Report passed the House by a vote of 319 to 100111 and
the Senate by a vote of 65 to 30.1°7
4. The Presidential Veto
On December 20, 1995, President William Jefferson Clinton vetoed
the PSLRA. 08 Despite supporting the need for reform in securities
fraud laws, he found that "the pleading requirements of the Conference Report with regard to a defendant's state of mind impose[d] an
unacceptable procedural hurdle to meritorious claims being heard in
Federal courts."'0 9 President Clinton stated that he was willing to endorse the Second Circuit standard, but not the more stringent one de100. 141 Cong. Rec. S19,066-67 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
101. 141 Cong. Rec. H13,692 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995).
102. Senator Dodd explained that the Judicial Committee wanted the change -because 'particularity' already has a meaning under law and 'specifically allege' does

not." 141 Cong. Rec. S19,067 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995). Judge Anthony Scirica, a
Third Circuit judge and member of the judiciary committee, requested that the

change be made. 141 Cong. Rec. S19,044-45 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995); see also 141
Cong. Rec. S19,066 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (reprinting the letter of J. Anthony Scirica to the Senate Committee).
103. 141 Cong. Rec. S19,067 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995).
104. See 141 Cong. Rec. S19,070-71 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995).

105. See Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 69, at 951.
106. 141 Cong. Rec. H15,223-24 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
107. 141 Cong. Rec. S19,154 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995).
108. 141 Cong. Rec. H15,214-15 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995); see also Amy Neeno,
Clinton Vetoes Securities Reform Bill, Override Likely, West's Legal News, Dec. 27,
1995, available in 1995 WL 860908 (noting that the President held the bill until the last

minute because he "ha[d] specific concern about one aspect of the conference
report").
109. 141 Cong. Rec. H15,215 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
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lineated in the Statement of Managers.1 1 ° He felt that any higher

standard would preclude defrauded plaintiffs, with legitimate claims,
from bringing suit in Federal court.11 ' President Clinton recognized
the need to strike a balance between legitimate plaintiffs and plaintiffs
who were filing "strike
suits," and he was not comfortable that the
1 12
PSLRA met that goal.
B.

Overriding the Veto: The New Pleading Standard

On December 20, 1995, the House reopened debate on the
PSLRA. 113 The Senate followed suit by reopening debate on December 21, 1995.114 After lively'discussion on the floor of both houses,
both the House and Senate voted to override President Clinton's
veto,115 and the 16PSLRA passed as an official amendment to the 1934
Exchange Act.'
At all times during the discussion of the override, Congress kept the
goal of the legislation in mind. Senator Feinstein addressed the Senate: "I want to protect the small investor ...and yet do away with the

kind of lawsuit that happens because a companies' [sic] stock drops, a
suit is filed, they press discovery and they move and collect a large

settlement from the company, when the suit may be baseless."' 17 Despite an agreement on the common goal of the PSLRA, many Congresspersons still were confused by the language of the Statement of
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See 141 Cong. Rec. S19,060 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995).
115. See 141 Cong. Rec. S19,146 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995).
116. See 141 Cong. Rec. H15,223-24 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995); 141 Cong. Rec.
S19,146 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995). The new statute reads as follows:
(b) Requirements for securitiesfraud actions
(1) Misleading statements and omissions
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff alleges
that the defendant-(A) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(B) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances in which they were made, not
misleading; the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an
allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and
belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.
(2) Required state of mind
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff may
recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to
a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)&(2) (1997).
117. 141 Cong. Rec. S19,064 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
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Mangers concerning the "heightened standard.""'
Although the
Statement of Managers is not binding, it reflects Congress's perception of the meaning of the statute. 119 Thus, many in Congress were
concerned that the standard was too high. Enough Congresspersons,
however, were convinced that the PSLRA standard was not unduly
burdensome to permit override of Clinton's veto.
C. Utter Confusion Ensues: Three Lines of Cases
Despite its good intentions, the PSLRA has fallen far short of its
goal to clarify the scienter pleading requirement. In fact, three distinct lines of cases have developed, each with a different interpretation of the PSLRA. The first line of cases follows the holding of In Re
Baesa Securities Litigation."0 Baesa held that the PSLRA does not
change what constitutes scienter, but does require a heightened pleading standard. The second line of cases, typified by In re Silicon
Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation, 2 ' adopts the most stringent view
of the "heightened" pleading standard imposed by the PSLRA. This
court held that a plaintiff must plead circumstantial evidence of conscious behavior. The third line of cases, exemplified by Pilarczyk v.
Morrison Knudsen Corp.,"2 held that the PSLRA adopted the prior
Second Circuit test and the Second Circuit case law interpreting the
scienter pleading standard.' 23
1. Heightened Pleading Requirement But No Change to the
Substantive Requirement of Scienter
In Baesa, 24 Judge Rakoff addressed the issue of the PSLRA's new
pleading and scienter standard. The Baesa court concluded that the
118. See supra note 105.
119. See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) ("IThe authoritative
source for finding the Legislature's intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill,
which 'represen[t] the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen
involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation."' (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396
U.S. 168, 186 (1969))); see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 421
(7th Cir. 1993) (stating that a conference report is "the most persuasive evidence of
congressional intent besides the statute itself").
120. 969 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
121. No. 96-0393C, 1996 WL 664639 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996).
122. 965 F. Supp. 311 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
123. See In re Health Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 201 (E.D.N.Y.
1997); Vladimir v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, No. 95 CIV. 10319, 1997 WL 151330, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1997); Page v. Derrickson, No. 96-842-Civ-T-17C, 1997 WL
148558, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 1997); Fugman v. Aprogenex, Inc., 961 F. Supp.
1190, 1195 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (N.D.
111. 1997); Fischler v. AmSouth Bancorp., No. 96-1567-CIV-T-17A, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17670, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 1996); Marksman Partners L.P. v.Chantal
Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1308 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
124. 969 F. Supp. at 238.
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PSLRA only changed the pleading requirement,
leaving the substan12 5
tive definition of scienter untouched.
In November of 1993, Baesa, an Argentinean bottling company
publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange, entered an agreement with Pepsico, Inc.12 6 Pepsico acquired 24% of Baesa's common
stock in exchange for 35 million dollars, various Pepsi bottling rights
and distribution rights in Argentina, and the right to make certain
Baesa management decisions. 2' In 1996, the president of Baesa resigned and Pepsico took control of the company.12 8 Pepsico announced that Baesa had 12 suffered
substantial losses because of
"accounting irregularities." 9 Baesa shareholders filed a securities
fraud suit against Baesa, claiming that between November 1995 and
August 1996, Baesa issued "numerous false and misleading public
statements that materially overstated the company's assets and earnings and effectively concealed the company's deteriorating financial
position."' 3 ° The opinion of the court noted, however, that the
"[c]omplaint [by the shareholders] [was] noticeably skimpy in setting
forth particular facts from which one might strongly infer that Baesa
31
... or Pepsico had knowledge" that the financial reports were false.1
Judge Rakoff found that, when addressing the issue of securities
fraud, courts must distinguish the mental state required to prove actual securities fraud cases from the pleading elements necessary to allege that mental state when the lawsuit is filed. 32 According to the
Baesa court, the PSLRA only addresses the latter issue.133 By focusing on the statutory language of the amendment, Judge Rakoff concluded that the definition of what constitutes scienter was not changed
by the PSLRA,'3 4 but rather that the PSLRA expressly
altered what
35
was required to plead-and not prove-scienter1
Specifically, the Baesa court focused on the statutory language of
section 21D(b)(2) to conclude that the substantive definition of scienter was not altered by the legislation.1 36 The court reasoned that its
125. Id. at 242.
126. Id. at 240.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. "[T]he legally cognizable allegations of fraudulent conduct largely center
on financial and other irregularities at Baesa's Brazilian subsidiary, a separate company known as 'PCE,' that is not a party to this case but the financial statements of
which were included in Baesa's public reports." Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 241-42. Judge Rakoff cited to Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs,Dep't of Laborv. Greenwich Collieries,512 U.S. 267,280 (1994), to support
his theory that, "[w]hen the statutory text is so plain," the court should not resort to
legislative history. Basea, 969 F. Supp at 241.
135. Id. at 242.
136. Id. at 240.
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definition of scienter would have to come from either another section
of the Exchange Act or from existing case law. 137 Because the Exchange Act does not define scienter, the Baesa court looked to case
law.138 In prior cases, recklessness and intent to deceive had been
deemed sufficient to meet the scienter definition.' 39 Thus, the court
noted that, "[w]hile the Supreme Court remains free to overrule that
determination, nothing in the [PSLRA] purports to do so.'" Consequently, Judge Rakoff concluded that while the PSLRA had changed
the pleading standard, the underlying scienter element of a 1Ob-5
claim had not changed.141
The Baesa court then examined what the PSLRA's pleading standard required. The language of the statute was suggested by prior law
in the Second Circuit, and the statute did not "single[ I out any ...
special kind of particulars as presumptively sufficient."14 2 Therefore,
"[t]he conclusion follow[ed] from the plain language of the statute
that the mere pleading of motive and opportunity [did] not ... auto-

matically suffice to raise a strong inference of scienter."' 4 3 Consequently, under the PSLRA, a plaintiff must "set forth sufficient
particulars, of whatever kind, to raise a strong inference of the required scienter."'" Although pleading motive and opportunity would
have satisfied the old Second Circuit pleading requirement, such a
pleading, by itself, is no longer automatically sufficient under the
PSLRA. 4 5 The court made this point very clear:

This, of course, does not mean that particulars regarding motive and
opportunity may not be relevant to pleading circumstances from
which a strong inference of fraudulent scienter may be inferred. In
some cases, they may even be sufficient by themselves to do so.
But, under the Reform Act, and in contrast to prior Second Circuit
precedent, they are not presumed sufficient to do so. Rather, under
the Reform Act formulation, the pleadings must set forth sufficient
particulars, of whatever
kind, to raise a strong inference of the re46
quired scienter.

Although not engaging in its own interpretive analysis, the district
court in Press v. Quick & Reilly noted that "[a] judge in this district
has recently held, after thorough analysis of the... [PSLRA], a pleading of motive and opportunity alone is not sufficient to raise a strong
137. Id.
138. Id. at 240-41.
139. Id. at 241.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 242; see also NY Judge Rules Recklessness 'Is Enough' Under Reform
Act, Andrews Sec. & Commodities Litig. Rep., Sept. 24, 1997.
142. Baesa, 969 F. Supp. at 242.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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inference of fraudulent scienter."' 47 Accordingly, a pleading now
must set forth particulars that give rise to "a strong inference that the
Defendants acted with fraudulent scienter.' 1 48 Consistent with the
Baesa court, the Press court found that even if motive and opportunity
were pled, there still needed to be facts alleged that gave rise to the
requisite "strong inference" of fraud.' 49 Consequently, the Press
court agreed with Baesa that the old Second Circuit test, while illustrative,50 was no longer a dispositive way to plead scienter in 10b-5
cases.1
2.

A Heightened Pleading Standard Alters the Substantive Nature
of Scienter

In September of 1996, the Northern District of California interpreted the PSLRA in In re Silicon Graphics ("Silicon Graphics I").15I
In addressing the pleading requirement, the court argued that Congress supplanted the Ninth Circuit's prior standard 152 with the
PSLRA. Silicon Graphics I held that, under the PSLRA, neither option of the Second Circuit test is dispositive.153 Further, the court believed that
Congress effectively altered the substantive nature of
54
scienter.1
Silicon Graphics, Inc., a publicly traded corporation, "design[ed]
and [sold] desktop graphics work stations, multi-processor servers, advanced computing platforms, and application software.' 5 5 In late
August of 1995, Silicon Graphics stock was being traded for $44-7/8.156

On October 19, 1995, Silicon Graphics announced a thirty-three percent growth in revenue for the first quarter. 57 Despite these showings, the market considered this a disappointing result.' 58 In an effort
to reassure investors that Silicon Graphics would be able to meet its
growth targets, management "issued periodic updates ...reasserting

its confidence about [its] second quarter results.' 1 59 Due to the confident remarks of the company's management, the stock price re147. No. 96 CIV. 4278, 1997 WL 458666, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1997) (citing
Baesa. 969 F. Supp. at 238).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 96-0393C, 1996 WL 664639 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 25, 1996) ("Silicon Graphics I").
152. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
153. Silicon Graphics 1, 1996 WL 664639, at *5.
154. Id.
155. Id. at *1.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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bounded strongly, reaching the high $30 price range."w By January of
1996, however, rumors of "lower than anticipated" results once again
led the stock to plummet to "a low of $22 per share."' 61 Plaintiffs filed
a class action complaint alleging violations of 10(b) on January 29,
1996.162

The court dismissed this suit, with leave to amend, for failure to
plead scienter adequately under the PSLRA. 63 According to Judge
Fern Smith, "Congress adopted a more stringent pleading standard"
than previously used, when it enacted the PSLRA.'
The Silicon
Graphics I court explained that "Congress did not simply codify the
Second Circuit standard"
but, in fact, intended to strengthen the
165
pleading requirement.
The court first looked at the Conference Committee report accompanying the PSLRA. 66 The court noted that the report explicitly
stated that "it [did] not intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law"
interpreting the "strong inference" pleading standard.1 67 The court
also noted that by eliminating the Specter Amendment, which was essentially the codification of the Second Circuit standard, Congress cemented its intent to heighten the pleading standard beyond the old
Second Circuit standard."6 Finally, the court turned to President
Clinton's veto message and Congress's response: "Further emphasizing [Congress's] 'crystal clear' intent69 to heighten the pleading standard, Congress overrode the veto.'
Although the court concluded Congress had eschewed the prior
Second Circuit test for scienter, it also had to grapple with the
PSLRA's pleading standard.17 0 In justifying its interpretation of the
statute, the court explained: "[T]he authoritative source for finding
the Legislature's intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill,
which 'represen[t] the considered and collective understanding of
those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation." 171 After reviewing this legislative history, the court held
160. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 750 (N.D. Cal. 1997)
("Silicon Graphics I").
161. Silicon Graphics I, 1996 WL 664639, at *1.

162. Id.
163. Id. at *16.

164. Id. at *5.
165. Id
166. Id.
167. Id. (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 41 n.23 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740 n.23).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. The Silicon Graphics I court did not explain why it went directly to the legisla-

tive history of the statute to analyze the new standard, rather than first looking to the
plain language of the statute. The court merely set forth the new standard and then
addressed the legislative history. Id. at *5.
171. Id. at *6 (quoting Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (quoting
Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969))). The court also cited Resolution Trust
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"that plaintiff must allege specific facts that constitute circumstantial
evidence of conscious behavior by defendants."' 7 2 Because Congress
did not include the motive, opportunity, and recklessness language
from the Second Circuit standard, the court noted that the PSLRA
adopted a stricter pleading standard.173 By requiring the pleading of
conscious behavior, the Silicon Graphics I court effectively removed
the opportunity for the plaintiffs to plead recklessness as a form of
scienter.
The plaintiffs of Silicon Graphics I filed an amended class action
complaint and, in May of 1997, Judge Smith again ruled that the complaint did not establish a "strong inference" of fraud.'7 4 The Silicon
Graphics 11 court relied on the legislative history of the PSLRA and
the history of 10(b) actions to find that the Second Circuit standard
was no longer sufficient to plead scienter. 17 5 "After reviewing the arguments and the legal authorities, the Court believe[d]
that its original
'176
interpretation [in Silicon Graphics I] was correct.
Despite affirming its original ruling, the court noted that "[i]n certain areas of the law recklessness [was] considered to be a form of
77
intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act."'
The court explained that the Sundstrand standard that had been
adopted by many circuits "appear[ed] compatible with the Supreme
Court cases., 178 But, even within this standard, there "is conflicting
authority about what constitutes scienter for purposes of Section
10(b). ' 179 One line of cases in the Second Circuit required "actual
intent or circumstances implying actual intent before finding scienter." 180 The Silicon Graphics II court stated that this latter approach
"[was] more consistent with Supreme Court precedent regarding Section 10(b) scienter."''1 1 Thus, the Silicon Graphics II court held that
"[m]otive, opportunity, and non-deliberate recklessness may provide
Corp. v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 421 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that a conference report

"is the most persuasive evidence of congressional intent besides the statute itself")
and In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 912 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that committee reports,

not "[sjtray comments by individual legislators," provide the best expression of legislative intent).
172. Silicon Graphics 1, 1996 WL 664639, at *6.
173. Id.
174. Silicon Graphics 11, 970 F. Supp. 746, 768 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
175. Id. at 755-57.
176. Id. at 754.
177. Id. at 755 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12

(1976)).
178. Id. at 755. The Sundstrand standard is discussed in supra notes 21-25.
179. Silicon Graphics II, 970 F. Supp. at 755; see supra note 25 and accompanying
text.
180. In re Leslie Fay Cos. Sec. Litig., 871 F. Supp. 686, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding
that, for outside auditors, "only behavior which is either deliberate or so reckless that
an inference of fraudulent intent might be drawn by a reasonable finder of fact" will

constitute scienter (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
181. Silicon Graphics 11, 970 F. Supp. at 756.
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some evidence of intentional wrongdoing, but are not alone sufficient
to support scienter unless the totality of the evidence creates a strong
inference of fraud.""im It appears that although the court confirmed
its Silicon Graphics I holding, it wavered
as to whether evidence of
183
recklessness could constitute scienter.
3. No Substantive or Pleading Requirement Changes: The Second
Circuit Test is Still Valid
In direct opposition to the Silicon Graphics I holding, the district
court in Pilarczyk v. Morrison Knudsen Corp."s held that the PSLRA

codified the Second Circuit standard that had previously been used to
determine whether a plaintiff had met the pleading requirement for
the 1934 Exchange Act. The Pilarczyk court represents the least stringent interpretation of the PSLRA.
The plaintiffs were principles in TMS, a N.Y. corporation engaged
in the business of rebuilding turbochargers.8s5 In 1992, representatives of Morrison Knudsen Corporation ("MK") approached several
plaintiffs regarding the potential acquisition of TMS by MK.'1 TMS
received "glowing reports" about MK during the negotiation period."ar In fact, in 1991, the annual report of MK highlighted its successes."m As a result, TMS agreed that MK would buy TMS. 1s9 An
182. Id. at 757 (emphasis added).
183. Id. The Silicon GraphicsI holding has been followed most recently in Friedberg v. Discreet Logic Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42 (D. Mass. 1997). Turning to the Conference Committee Report of the PSLRA to interpret the "strong inference"
requirement, the Friedbergcourt pointed out that "[t]he Conference Committee regarded the Second Circuit pleading standard as the 'most stringent pleading standard' previously used by the circuits. Id. at 48 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at
41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740). While acknowledging that the
Second Circuit test was the strictest, the Committee expressed its desire to heighten it
still further. "Because the Conference Committee intends to strengthen existing
pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading standard." Id. (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 41 &
n.23, reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740 & n.23). The court reasoned that if the
Conference Committee had wanted to merely adopt the Second Circuit standard,
then they would have adopted the Senate version of the legislation, S. 240. Id. at 4849. From the Committee's rejection of S.240 (the Second Circuit test) and its embrace of an even higher standard, the Friedberg court concluded that the PSLRA
commands a pleading standard stronger than that previously used in the Second Circuit. Id. (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 41, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C-A.N.
740).
184. 965 F. Supp. 311 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
185. Id-at 313.
186. Id. at 314.
187. Id.
188. Id. The successes included: "(1) winning a $380 million Illinois contract to
manufacture 313 cars, the largest transit award in MK history: and (2) a S155 million
contract to build 88 cars for the California Department of Transportation." Id. The
court cited a 1991 report which stated that:
MK is well-positioned to meet the growing needs of the vast transportation
market. The company is unsurpassed in its ability to design, construct, man-
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agreement was drawn up which provided that MK could acquire TMS
for $14,000,000.190 The transaction would be structured as a tax-free

reorganization in which TMS would exchange its stock for MK
stock. 191 The deal closed on December 30, 1992.192 On July 19, 1994,
193
MK issued a press release announcing a 40.5 million-dollar lOSS.
The plaintiffs alleged that "MK knew of certain problems in its rail
systems business"
when the deal was closed, but never alerted them to
1 94
the problem.
According to Judge McAvoy, the requisite "strong inference" of
fraud may be established by using the Second Circuit standard, as the
Reform Act merely adopted the stringent pleading requirements of
the Second Circuit.' 95 According to the Pilarczyk court, therefore,
"[t]he requisite 'strong inference' of fraud may be established either
(a) by alleging facts to show that defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or (b) by alleging facts that constitute
strong circumstantial
evidence of conscious misbehavior or
96
recklessness."1
In Rehm v. Eagle Finance Corp.,197 a district court in the Northern

District of Illinois held that Congress did not adopt a more restrictive
pleading standard than the Second Circuit standard and did not bind
courts to any particular interpretation of the scienter standard when it
passed the PSLRA. gs The court cited three factors as support for its
interpretation of the PSLRA: the statutory language, the legislative
history, and the purpose of the amendment to the 1934 Act. 199
The Eagle court found that the language of the PSLRA "mirror[ed]
the language traditionally employed by the Second Circuit in its application of Rule 9(b) to scienter pleadings. 200 The court also found
that the legislative history supported its interpretation of the PSLRA.
age construction, operate and finance complex infrastructure projects. MK
also has gained a reputation for quality and excellence in both the manufacture of new rail cars and the remanufacture of rail cars and locomotives.
MK is the only U.S.-owned and operated manufacturer of new transit cars
necessary to meet the country's growing urban transit needs.
Id. (citation omitted).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.

192. Id. at 315.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 320; see S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
679, 694. In a footnote, Judge McAvoy wrote: "In any event, this dispute is much ado
about nothing, since the Reform Act merely adopts the stringent pleading requirements of the Second Circuit." Pilarczyk, 965 F. Supp at 320 n.8.
196. Pilarczyk, 965 F. Supp at 320 (citing In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d
259, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1993)).
197. 954 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
198. Id. at 1252.
199. Id.

200. Id.
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The court noted that the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
Committee remarked: "The Committee does not adopt a new and
untested pleading standard that would generate additional litigation.
Instead, the Committee chose a uniform standard modeled (sic) upon
the pleading standard of the Second Circuit."2' 1 Finally, the court believed that by adopting the Second Circuit standard, the "conflicting
policy concerns underlying the act" would be satisfied.202
III. ZN RE BAESA: THE RIGHT RESULT, THE WRONG ANSWER

The Baesa decision is the best statutory interpretation of the
PSLRA. Although Baesa represents the best reading of the PSLRA,
it is not the best solution to the strike suit problems that Congress
sought to eradicate. To properly resolve the strike suit problem, Congress should codify the tested and proven Second Circuit approach.
A. The Baesa Court Got It Right
The Baesa decision represents the correct interpretation of the
PSLRA; the plain language of the statute and the circumstances surrounding its passage make it clear that the PSLRA heightened the
pleading standard for scienter in 10b-5 actions, but 20did
not go so far as
3
to alter whether recklessness qualifies as scienter.
1. Heightened Pleading Standard for Scienter
Section 21D(b) of the PSLRA was specifically introduced to rectify
the circuit split between the Second and Ninth Circuits. 2° The split
revolved around the required specificity of scienter pleading in 10b-5
actions." 5 Courts agreed that conscious intent and some forms of
recklessness constituted scienter.2 6 Thus, the circumstances surrounding the bill indicate that the PSLRA attempted to change the
pleading requirements to get into court, not what a plaintiff would
actually have to prove once there. 0 7
Furthermore, the overall goal of the PSLRA was to deter the filing
of strike suits while still alloving meritorious suits to go forward. 2 s
201. Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,
694).
202. Id.
203. Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 69, at 896 (stating that "[section 21D(b)(2)
scrupulously avoids any implication that it alters the standard for what actually constitutes scienter under the Exchange Act").
204. See supra Part I.B (discussing the pre-PSLRA circuit split).
205. See supra Part I.B.
206. See supra note 25.
207. Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 69, at 913 (noting that "[slection 21D(b)(2)
preserves existing law for the state of mind necessary to establish liability").
208. See generally 141 Cong. Rec. H2761 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Fields) ("Strike suits do not contribute to market efficiency. They contribute to affluent lifestyles of strike suit lawyers."); 141 Cong. Rec. H2763 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995)
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To screen strike suits, the standard for scienter had to be heightened
at the commencement of the suit. 20 9 Congress was well aware that
changing either the pleading or the substantive scienter standard to
eliminate strike suits might preclude meritorious plaintiffs from the
courtroom.21 ° Thus, Congress chose to strike such a balance by
heightening only the pleading standard for scienter.2 1 1 Baesa correctly
realized that while Congress raised the pleading standard, it did not
raise it so high as to preclude reckless conduct from constituting scienter.212 Baesa recognized that Congress did not eliminate recklessness
as a sufficient form of scienter for pleading 10b-5 actions, because it
knew meritorious plaintiffs would be excluded from the courtroom
because they would not be able to meet the higher standard without
the benefits of discovery. 1 3 Thus, the Baesa decision correctly reflects the balancing Congress intended.

The language of the statute, as well as the circumstances and history
surrounding its passage, further illustrates that Congress only heightened the pleading standard-not the proof standard-for scienter in
the PSLRA. In describing scienter, Congress's choice of the wording,
(statement of Rep. Eshoo) ("[O]ur final objective must be the Congress must pass
and the President should sign into law legislation which provides relief from meritless
lawsuits and do it this year.").
209. By requiring more of plaintiffs prior to the commencement of the law suit,
Congress was effectively trying to curb the number of strike plaintiffs who file cookie
cutter complaints with little factual backing for their claims. 141 Cong. Rec. S17,934
(daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. D'Amato) ("The conference report stops
abusive securities litigation before it starts. It will help to weed out frivolous complaints before companies have to start paying enormous legal bills.").
210. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. S17,936 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Sarbanes) ("This legislation will affect far more than frivolous suits.... This bill will
make it more difficult for investors to bring and recover damages in legitimate fraud
actions ....").President Clinton was also concerned that the new standard would
preclude legitimate plaintiffs from the courtroom. 141 Cong. Rec. H15,215 (daily ed.
Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of President Clinton) ("I believe that the pleading requirements of the Conference Report ... impose an unacceptable procedural hurdle to
meritorious claims being heard in Federal courts.").
211. See supra Part III.A.1. By increasing only the pleading standard and not
changing the substantive nature of scienter, plaintiffs can still plead recklessness as a
form of scienter. They will now have to allege more specific facts of recklessness or
conscious intent to defraud. See infra Part III.A.2. Many observers have noted that
eliminating recklessness as a form of scienter would preclude many meritorious suits.
See Hearing on PrivateSecurities Reform Act by the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Comm.
on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs of the United States Senate, 104th Cong., (statement of Mark J. Griffin, Director, Division of Securities, Utah Department of Commerce, on behalf of the North American Securities Administrators Association).
Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the SEC, testified before the House subcommittee that "a
retreat from the recklessness standard would greatly erode the deterrent effect of
private actions." House Hearings, supra note 64, at 191-212 (statement of Arthur
Levitt).
212. In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
213. Many small investors will not be able to give detailed specifics to the fraud
they are alleging without first having the benefit of discovery. The lack of information
available to them prior to discovery is just too great to overcome.
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"required state of mind," indicates a desire to preserve the substantive
definition of scienter. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "[a]
fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise
defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." '1 4 The Court also has explained that, "Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial
interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation" when it
uses the same language in another statute. 1 5 "[W]here ...Congress
adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation
given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new
statute. 2' 16 Because Federal courts had long-settled the issue that intentional conduct and some form of recklessness met the definition of
scienter,217 Congress's inclusion of the "required state of mind" language in the PSLRA suggests that Congress maintained the substantive definition of scienter2 18
The fact that the PSLRA did not alter scienter in section 21D is also
evident from two other passages of the statute. First, in the PSLRA,
Congress changed the substantive nature of scienter for forward-looking statements in section 21E. 119 The new law created a "safe harbor"
that protects defendants from liability for forward-looking statements.' If a plaintiff wants to plead fraud based on forward-looking
statements the plaintiff must prove that the statements made by the
defendant were made with "actual knowledge" that the statements
were false.22 ' It would be redundant to include this provision if, in
every 10(b) suit, a plaintiff had to plead "actual knowledge." Second, Congress carefully ensured that reckless conduct would not
give rise to joint liability.' Section 21D(g) states, with respect to that
subsection, that a defendant "knowingly commits a violation of the
securities law" only if she acts with "actual knowledge" of falsity. 2 4
214. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
215. Lorillard, A Div. of Loew's Theaters, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978).
216. Id at 581.

217. See supra notes 23 & 24 and accompanying text.
218. See 141 Cong. Rec. S17,984 (daily ed. Dec. 5. 1995) (statement of Sen. Mose-

ley-Braun) (commenting that "the original House bill abolished liability for reckless
conduct; the Senate bill did not, and the Senate position prevailed in conference"); see
also 141 Cong. Rec. H14,040 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bliley) (re-

marking that "[tihe conference report is careful not to change standards of liability
under the securities laws").
219. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (1995).
220. l

221. Id § 78u-5(c)(1)(B).
222. But see Silicon Graphics I, No. C. 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639. at 06 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 25, 1996).
223. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(2) (1995).
224. Id § 78u-4(g)(10)(A) (emphasis added). The statute states that for this subsection "reckless conduct by a covered person shall not be construed to constitute a
knowing commission of a violation of the securities laws by that covered person." I&
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Thus, when Congress wanted to alter the definition of scienter to require actual knowledge, it did so specifically in the PSLRA.2 1 Because there is no language indicating a substantive change in scienter
in section 21D(b)(2), Congress must have intended scienter to remain
unchanged for the typical 10b-5 suit.
At least one court has wrongly interpreted the PSLRA as changing
scienter2 26 As discussed above, the plain language of the PSLRA
compels the courts to not read the PSLRA as altering the substantive

nature of scienter.2 2 7 The Silicon Graphics I court, however, inter-

preted the statute to conclude that a "plaintiff must allege specific
facts" of "conscious behavior" on the part of the defendant in order to
meet the scienter requirement for securities fraud actions. 228 The
court's holding-requiring pleading of a "conscious" intent-directly
conflicts with the "required state of mind" language of the statute,
which, as shown earlier,229 must include reckless conduct as a form of
scienter.
Silicon Graphics I effectively places a plaintiff in an impossible situation.023 While the court requires a plaintiff to plead scienter with
something more than recklessness, at trial recklessness still would suf-

fice as proof because the statute did not change the substantive scienter standard. 3 1 This leaves the plaintiff in the untenable position of

having to plead more to get into court than she has to prove once in
court. The Supreme Court has said that when a reading of a statute
leads to absurd results, the statute "[should] be given a reasonable
application consistent with . . . the legislative purpose" of the stat§ 78u-4(g)(10)(B). The statute further says that "[n]othing in this subsection shall be
construed to create, affect, or in any manner modify, the standard for liability associated with any action arising under the securities laws." Id. § 78u-4(g)(1).
225. This is evidenced by the change in standard for forward looking statements
and joint liability. See id. § 78u-5(c), 4(g)(2)(A). There is a cannon of statutory interpretation that supports this finding as well: expressio unius est excusio alterius. This
means that "expression of the one is exclusion of the other." Antonin Scalia, A Matter
of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 25 (1997). Thus, because the court included a specific caveat that recklessness did not qualify as scienter in two sections of
the statute, it must qualify in the others.
226. Silicon Graphics 1, 1996 WL 664639, at *6.
227. See supra Part III.A.1.
228. Silicon Graphics 1, 1996 WL 664639, at *6. The SEC filed an amicus brief with
the court, requesting that Judge Smith reconsider the question of recklessness. The
SEC argued that the "federal legislative history of the Act shows it does not prohibit
the pleading of recklessness .... " SEC Asks Judge to Take Another Look at Silicon
Fraud Ruling, Andrews Corp. Officers and Directors Liability Litig. Rep., Feb. 12,
1997, available in WESTLAW, 1997 ANCODLLR 20717.
229. See supra notes 207-24 and accompanying text.
230. Silicon Graphics 1, 1996 WL 664639, at *6 ("Because Congress chose not to
include that language from the Second Circuit standard relating to motive, opportunity, and recklessness, Congress must have adopted the Conference Committee view
.... The Court therefore holds that plaintiff must allege specific facts that constitute
circumstantial evidence of conscious behavior by defendants.").
231. See supra Part L.A (discussing the substantive nature of scienter).
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ute.2 32 Congress could not have intentionally placed a plaintiff in this
situation. 3a The Baesa court's clear determination that only the
pleading standard was heightened by the PSLRA removes the plaintiff from the absurd situation the Silicon Graphics I decision
compels.3
2. What Pleading Standard Does the PSLRA Establish?
While the statute's text and the surrounding circumstances indicate
that Congress only intended to alter the pleading requirements for
10b-5 actions," 5 the next logical inquiry asks what standard Congress
embraced in the PSLRA. This part argues that the statute's ambiguous wording justifies resort to the PSLRA's legislative history to glean
Congress's intentions with respect to the appropriate pleading standard. The PSLRA's legislative history indicates that a heightened
pleading requirement that is based partly, but not exclusively, on the
prior Second Circuit test is the best reading of the PSLRA.
One well-accepted canon of statutory interpretation is that courts
should first look to the plain language of the statute for its true meaning." 6 A corollary to this canon is that courts may look at legislative
history if there is a clear nexus between the statute's language and
legislative history." 7 Examining the language of the PSLRA, two
words in the statute mirror the language previously used by the Second Circuit:
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff
may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted
with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to
each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with par232. Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389, 394 (1940).
233. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (noting
that if interpreting the plain meaning of the words leads to "absurd or futile results...
this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act"); see also Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 332-33 (1938)

(same).
234. In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that -[i]f
the Reform Act... does nothing to disturb the substantive law of what is the required
mental state for a securities fraud violation, it does expressly address, and alter, what
is required to plead the requisite scienter").

235. See supra Part III.A.1.
236. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461

(1987) (noting that [i]n the absence of a "clearly expressed legislative intention to the

contrary," the language of the statute itself "must ordinarily be regarded as conclu-

sive" (quoting United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986)): see also United
States v. James 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986) (stating that judicial inquiry is ordinarily
complete upon examination of the language, unless the language is ambiguous).

237. Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 583 (1994) (finding that legislative

history must be "anchored in the text of the statute" in order for it to have interpretive weight).
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ticularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind. 23'

Nowhere in the statute is the "strong inference" requirement defined. 239 While these words have been defined in the context of the
Second Circuit standard,24 when taken out of their fuller context,
they no longer have the same meaning.24 Although presumably not a
codification of the Second Circuit test, the adoption of the strong inference language suggests that the Second Circuit test may still provide some insight into the standard. Thus, the PSLRA standard
remains somewhat vague and ambiguous; while it is possible to say
that the old Second Circuit test is helpful, it is still difficult to discern
the precise standard. The vagueness of the statutory language is fur-

ther evidenced by the three different interpretations courts have given
the "strong inference" phrase since the passage of the PSLRA. 42 Because of the statute's ambiguous language, courts are justified in turning to the language of the legislative history to interpret the statute.243
The legislative history of the PSLRA helps illuminate Congress's
intentions. Some commentators have argued that Congress codified

the Second Circuit standard. 2" The legislative history reveals, however, that Congress had the opportunity to codify the language of the
Second Circuit pleading standard, but it specifically declined to do
so. 245 Further, the "deletion [of the Specter Amendment] did not
238. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1995) (emphasis added). The language had previously been used by the Second Circuit. See, e.g., Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12
F.3d 1170, 1176 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that "although Rule 9(b) allows a pleader to
aver intent generally, a 10b-5 complaint nevertheless must allege facts that raise a
strong inference of fraudulent intent"); Ross v. A. H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 558
(2d Cir. 1979) (requiring 10b-5 plaintiffs to plead facts which give rise to a "strong
inference of knowledge").
239. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (1995).
240. See infra note 248.
241. If Congress intended to merely codify the Second Circuit standard, then they
would have adopted more language from that standard. As noted above, a canon of
statutory interpretation dictates that if Congress had adopted the Second Circuit standard, in its entirety, then it would have adopted the corresponding language. See
supra note 216 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has recognized that if
language is taken from another statute, then Congress and the courts are presumed to
know the interpretation. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
242. See supra Part II.D.
243. See supra note 236. Because the language of the statute is vague the
"[l]egislative history can be a legitimate guide" to the statute's interpretation. Burlington N. R.R. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987).
244. See Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 69, at 956; see also Weiss, supra note 34, at
675 (finding that "[m]ost observers viewed [the PSLRA] as little more than a codification of the Second Circuit's long-standing interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)").
245. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. The Conference Committee had S.
240 in front of it, which contained the Specter Amendment codifying the Second Circuit pleading standard. See 141 Cong. Rec. S9201 (daily ed. June 28, 1995) (adding the
Specter amendment to S.240, the bill that went to the Conference Committee from
the Senate). Congress specifically chose not to adopt this language by deleting the
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stand alone. ''2 6 The Conference Committee also made it clear that
the Second Circuit test was no longer applicable to the pleading47 standard for securities fraud cases in the Statement of Managers:
Regarded as the most stringent pleading standard, the Second Circuit requirement is that the plaintiff state facts with particularity,
and that these facts, in turn, must give rise to a "strong inference" of
the defendant's fraudulent intent. Because the Conference Committee intends to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does
not intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this
pleading standard. 24
In a footnote following this remark, the Conference Committee said,
"[f]or this reason, the Conference Report chose not to include in the
pleading standard certain language relating to motive, opportunity, or
recklessness. '249 By using the Second Circuit language, but not including the Second Circuit test for pleading, Congress crafted a more
stringent pleading requirement. Moreover, the Senate also made it
clear that the PSLRA intended to heighten the pleading standard for
scienter.25 The Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee said:
The Committee does not adopt a new and untested pleading standard that would generate additional litigation. Instead, the Committee chose a uniform standard modeled upon the pleading
standard of the Second Circuit ....
The Committee does not intend
to codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this pleadingr
standard, although courts may find this body of law instructive.2
The only proper interpretation of the foregoing comments is that the
Senate adopted a more stringent standard than any previously being
used. Because the Senate language-with the conscious deletion of
the Specter amendment-was used in the PSLRA, it follows that the
PSLRA adopted the most stringent pleading standard.
President Clinton also interpreted the new legislation as requiring a
plaintiff to provide more factual information as to the nature of the
amendment from the final bill. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprintedin
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740. The deletion of a standard from the final bill, "strongly
militates against a judgement that Congress intended a result that it expressly declined to enact." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974); see
People for Envtl. Progress v. Leisz, 373 F. Supp. 589, 592 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (finding
that a conference committee's deletion of a proposed amendment from a final bill is
"significant" and "persuasive" evidence of Congressional intent).
246. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform Act:
Or, Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, in Securities Litigation 1996 515, 521 (PLI
Corp. Law & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B4-7141, 1996), available in
WESTLAW, 963 PLI/Corp 515.
247. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 41, reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740.
248. ld
249. Id at n.23.
250. S.Rep. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694.
251. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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fraud in the initial complaint filed with the court. 2 He vetoed the act
because he felt that a heightened pleading standard would prevent
plaintiffs who had legitimate fraud suits, but needed discovery to uncover more facts, from getting their day in court.2 5 3 President Clinton
had previously indicated to Congress he would support legislation that
codified the Second Circuit pleading requirements.25 4 His refusal to
support the PSLRA strongly suggests that the PSLRA contained a
pleading standard more stringent than the prior Second Circuit
standard.25 5
The Baesa decision cites to the PSLRA's legislative history to conclude that Congress intended to "raise[ ] the bar" for plaintiffs to get
into court. 6 Unlike the Silicon GraphicsI court, however, the Baesa
court recognized that the standard for pleading could only be raised so
much as to not affect the substantive definition of scienter 5 7 According to the Baesa court, a plaintiff must "state with particularity facts

giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." '58 This means that "the pleadings must set
forth sufficient particulars, of whatever kind, to raise a strong inference of the required scienter. ' ' 25 9 The court noted that the pleading
standard does not "single[ ] out any ... special kind of particulars as
presumptively sufficient" to meet the strong inference standard. 60

The Baesa court does not, therefore, define exactly what particulars
will constitute a "strong inference" of scienter; rather, it correctly
leaves the exact standard open to a factual inquiry on a case-by-case
basis.2 6 '

252. See 141 Cong. Rec. H15,214-15 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See Coffee, supra note 246, at 523-24 ("Accordingly, proponents of a stricter
standard might argue that in overriding the President's veto, Congress was unequivocally adopting a stricter standard.").
256. See supra Part II.D.1.
257. In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
258. Id. (quoting the Reform Act language).
259. Id. (stating that "the mere pleading of motive and opportunity does not, of
itself, automatically suffice to raise a strong inference of scienter .... [O]f course,
[this] does not mean that particulars regarding motive and opportunity may not be
relevant to pleading circumstances from which a strong inference of fraudulent scienter may be inferred").
260. Id.
261. Id. The court noted that:
[T]he question then is whether the well-pleaded non-conclusory factual allegations of the Complaint, read most favorably to plaintiffs and with every
reasonable inference construed in plaintiffs' favor, state sufficient particulars
to reasonably raise a strong inference that a given defendant participated in
the making of the allegedly fraudulent representations or omissions ....
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The Pilarczyk decision, conversely, does not comport with the legislative history of the PSLRA.2 62 By adopting the Second Circuit test,
the Pilarczyk court expressly disregarded the Conference Committee's Report.263 Although this court puts forth the best policy solution
to the current problem of pleading scienter, 2' Pilarczyk is wrong on
the law. Based on the statute's plain language and legislative history,
the Baesa court interprets the law correctly. The Baesa decision leads
to the conclusion that the PSLRA standard is vague and unclear. This
is why further Congressional action is needed.
B.

CongressionalAction Is Necessary to Fix the Mess

Although the Baesa decision represents the best interpretation of
the PSLRA, it does not strike the balance Congress intended. This
Note proposes that Congress amend the Exchange Act again to rectify
the further confusion it has created with respect to the pleading standard. The Second Circuit standard should be adopted by Congress
because it gives fair notice to plaintiffs and because, substantively, it
best strikes the best balance between meritorious and strike suits.
The Second Circuit encompasses New York City, the seat of the
financial world and the home of the New York Stock Exchange. It
thus has jurisdiction over innumerable securities fraud cases. The
Senate explicitly recognized the Second Circuit as the "leading circuit" in the areas of securities fraud cases when it was determining
z65
which existing pleading standard the PSLRA should adopt, if anyFurther, the Second Circuit has a wide body of case law exploring the
limits of its pleading test.266

By adopting the Second Circuit case law, Congress can effectively
give fair notice to all plaintiffs of what the statute requires to get into
court. A single standard, one that has case law to support it, will ensure that plaintiffs are treated uniformly. A plaintiff that has a claim
in California (the Ninth Circuit) should be required to meet the same
standard as that of a plaintiff in New York (the Second Circuit). 26 '
262. Pilarczyk v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 965 F. Supp. 311, 320 n.8 (N.D.N.Y.

1997) (stating "the Reform Act merely adopts the stringent pleading requirements of
the Second Circuit").
263. Id. While legislative history is not authoritative, it should be used when statutes are unclear. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n. 481 U.S. 454. 461

(1987).
264. See infra Part III.B.
265. S. Rep. 104-98 at 7 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 686.
266. See, eg., Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1994) (giving
just one example of the many cases that the Second Circuit has decided in lOb-5
cases). Senator Dodd, a sponsor of the bill, said he believed the adopted standard

was really the Second Circuit standard and that "[t]his legislation is there for [sic 1
using a pleading standard that has been successfully tested in the real world." 141
Cong. Rec. S8895 (daily ed. June 22, 1995).
267. Prior to the passage of the PSLRA, plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit had an easier
time pleading scienter than those plaintiffs in the Second Circuit. See supra Part I.B.

2552

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

Judges in the Second Circuit have already delineated the contours of
scienter under the test, making it easier for a plaintiff to know if they
have sufficient facts to plead their 10b-5 case.
Besides yielding fair and uniform results, the Second Circuit test
best strikes the balance between meritorious and strike suits:
[T]he continued availability of the Second Circuit criteria is consistent with the interests of institutional investors and their beneficiaries in enforcing the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws. Allowing plaintiffs to satisfy the Act's standard through allegations of recklessness or motive and opportunity strikes the appropriate balance between encouraging greater corporate disclosure...
and discouraging frivolous litigation without eviscerating protections against fraudulent conduct.2 68
Given the sheer number of cases the courts within the Second Circuit
have adjudicated, the Second Circuit has had the opportunity to delineate what facts will constitute scienter for pleading purposes. The following analysis of three Southern District of New York cases
illustrates that the Second Circuit is well-versed in determining the
limits of the scienter standard.
In Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc.,26 9 for example, the plaintiffs

claimed that IMCERA "misled the investing public by disseminating
materially false information and failing to correct prior statements, in
violation of Rule 10b-5. ' '2 T1 IMCERA produces three principal product lines: medical, specialty chemical, and agricultural and animal
health products.27 ' In 1989, IMCERA's agricultural and animal
health product subsidiary bought out Coopers Animal Health, Inc.
("Coopers") and acquired their Kansas City plant.2 72 As part of the
consolidation, IMCERA applied for Federal Drug Administration
("FDA") approval for the manufacture of seven additional animal
health products at the Coopers plant. 273 The FDA inspected the
plant, but found thirty-four deficiencies.274 Consequently, the FDA
delayed approval for the products. 2 75 In late 1991, IMCERA issued
an annual report to its shareholders stating that its "position in the
market was greatly enhanced by the acquisition of Coopers" and "expressed optimism for the upcoming year. '2 76 The company repeated
its optimism for the 1992 fiscal year in later announcements to the
One of the specific goals of the PSLRA was to ensure that plaintiffs were treated
equally, irrespective of their locale.
268. Seth Goodchild & Stephenie L. Brown, Institutional Investors and PSLRA
Pleading Standard, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 5, 1997, at Al.

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

47 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

275. Id.
276. Id.
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shareholders. On January 17, 1992, a FDA inspector gave IMCERA a
"twenty-page report citing eighty-five manufacturing deficiencies uncovered at the Kansas City plant."12 " That day, IMCERA suspended
production on seven products at the Coopers plant.278 IMCERA did
not, however, notify the investing public of the suspension in production until February 18, 1992.279 "On February 19, as a result of the
suspended sales and IMCERA's new position on projected earnings,
IMCERA shares dropped $4.50, or almost 12% .....
The plaintiffs
claimed that IMCERA's representation of an optimistic future, after
the FDA noted deficiencies in their first two inspections, was materially misleading."' The plaintiffs' pleading alleged that IMCERA's
Chairman of the Board and former CEO, George Kennedy, had a
motive and an opportunity to defraud investors.28 The Plaintiffs attempted to plead the "motive and opportunity" option for scienter by alleging:
(1) all defendant officers of IMCERA were motivated to inflate the
value of IMCERA stock because the increase in stock price had a
direct effect on their executive compensation; (2) defendant Kennedy was motivated because he stood to benefit from the inflated
value of IMCERA stock when he sold 384,000 shares in December
and January; and (3) defendant Kennedy directly benefited from the
delay because he sold 30,000 of his shares in January 28, 1992.2,
The court noted that the first claim was without merit.2 84 If this claim
sufficed as scienter, "virtually every company in the United States that
experience[d] a downturn in stock price could be forced to defend
securities fraud actions." 5 The court further held that the second
claim did not fulfill the motive requirement for scienter, because Kennedy's stock sales occurred before the FDA disclosed the results of
the third Coopers plant inspection.'
Further, the court explained
that "the sale of stock by one.., director does not give rise to a strong
inference of an intent to deceive the investing public."'
As to the
third claim of motive, the court found that "unusual insider trading
activity... may permit an inference of bad faith and scienter," but the
plaintiffs did not "establish that Kennedy's stock sales were 'unusual."'" To support its conclusion that the sales did not constitute
unusual insider activity, the court stressed that no other defendant
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id at 51.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id at 54.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
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sold their shares in the time period between the halt of production of
some of the Kansas City products and public disclosure of the failed
FDA inspection. 289 For the above reasons, the Acito court found that
pleadings of the plaintiff did not give rise to a "strong inference" of
scienter2 9g
In contrast, another court found that "motive and opportunity" was
sufficiently pled to meet the scienter standard in RMED International,
Inc. v. Sloan's Supermarkets, Inc.2 91 In this case, RMED, who
purchased Sloan stock in late 1993, "allege[d] that defendants ...
fail[ed] to disclose to its shareholders and investors that defendants
were targets of an investigation by the United States Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") concerning the illegal concentration in New
York City of supermarkets" owned and controlled by the defendant.2 12 Before 1991, all Sloan's stores were owned by Old Sloans S.193
In April 1991, though, Red Apple (owned by the CEO of Sloan's,
Catsimatidis) bought twenty-one Sloan's stores from Old Sloan's.94

The FTC began to investigate whether the sale of the 21 stores resulted in a violation of the antitrust laws.2 95 In March of 1993, Sloan's
acquired another eleven Sloan's supermarkets from Old Sloan's (now
operating under the name CKMR).2 96 "Thus, from April 1991 to

[March of 1995], Red Apple... operated 21 Sloan's supermarkets and
from March 1993 to [March 1995], Sloan's has operated 11 Sloan's
supermarkets" throughout New York City.2 97 Catsimatidis was aware
of the FTC investigation, but, "[n]evertheless, between February 28,
1993 and January 14, 1994, Sloan's communicated with its shareholders and made a number of SEC filings without ever disclosing the
existence of the ongoing FTC investigation. 29 1 One annual report
from Sloan's even declared that they were still actively seeking additional stores in the food industry. 99 On May 27, 1994, the FTC issued
a complaint against Sloan's. 3°° As a result of this complaint, the stock
price of Sloan's fell and did not recover.3 1 RMED subsequently filed
suit against Sloan's for failing to disclose the FTC investigation.30 2
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. 878 F. Supp. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
292. Id. at 17.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. The owner of Red Apple, Catsimatidis, was also the Chairman of the
Board, CEO, Treasurer, and 37% stockholder of Sloan's. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 18.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
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The RMED court found that the complaint "clearly alleg[ed] acts
sufficient to establish that defendants had a motive to commit fraud
'
and had an opportunity to do so."303
The court found that even
though Sloan's may not have been able to predict the outcome of the
FTC investigation, "the facts in the complaint sufficiently allege[d]
that Catsimatidis knew that Sloan's was in potential jeopardy of either
divestiture or restrictions on the future acquisition of supermarkets in
New York City or both."3" Catsimatidis had a motive to maintain the
appearance of financial health because "for the entire period of the
FTC investigation, [he] was the president and sole shareholder of Red
Apple. He was also chairman of the board, chief executive officer,
treasurer and 37% shareholder of Sloan's. ' 30 5 Further, the court held
that the defendants clearly had opportunity "by failing to disclose the
existence of the FTC investigation in the SEC filings or the communications to shareholders .... "I Thus, the court found that the3 7"motive and opportunity" test for defining scienter had been met.
The RMED court also illustrates a positive finding of recklessness
on the part of a defendant. According to the court, the "inference of
recklessness necessary to satisfy the scienter requirement can be
shown by 'facts demonstrating ...

that the defendant disseminated

material "knowing [it was] false or that the method of preparation was
so egregious as to render [the] dissemination reckless."
The
court found three alleged facts that met the "recklessness" requirement for scienter:
(1) Defendants' knew of the FTC investigation at the time RMED
acquired 226,600 shares of Sloans's stock.
(2) Defendants engaged in a continuous and prolonged pattern of
misrepresentations and omissions in their SEC filings and communications to their shareholders ....
(3) Catsimatidis had control over and intimate knowledge of Sloan's
business, and therefore had
a strong motive to keep Sloan's pros30 9
pects appearing healthy.

Because the FTC complaint alleged antitrust violations and sought relief in the form of divestment of Sloan's, the court explained that this
indicated that Sloan's would be affected by the resolution of the FTC
complaint.310 The court held, therefore, that the defendants acted
303. Id. at 19.
304. Id.
305. IL
306. Id.
307. Id
308. Id (alteration in original) (quoting Ades v. Deloitte & Touche, 799 F. Supp.
1493, 1498-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
309. Id. at 20 (citation omitted).
310. Id.
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recklessly in failing to inform RMED of the pending FTC investigation.31 ' Consequently, scienter was adequately pled.312
Finally, the district courts in the Second Circuit have well developed
case law on the limits of pleading recklessness. Their expertise is illustrated by the case of Plymack v. Copley Pharmaceutical,Inc.3 13 Copley is a manufacturer of generic drugs.3 14 The plaintiffs "purchased

Copley stock in February 1988 through a private placement arranged
by ... Ladenburg, a New York investment advisory firm. ' 315 At the
time the plaintiffs bought their stock, 23% of Copley was owned by
Harder

Pharmaceutical Limited

Partnership

("HPLP").3 16

The

Ladenburg group bought approximately 6% of the Copley stock.31 7
Terrence Harder and John Moroney represented HPLP and the
Ladenburg group on the Copley board of directors, respectively. 318 In
April 1991, HPLP wished to sell its interest in Copley, and Harder
said that HPLP wished to hire Ladenburg to find a buyer.31 9 Moroney
stated that if HPLP sold its shares, Ladenburg should also sell its
shares.32° In September 1991, TA Associates ("TA") "cold called" a
person at Copley.321 Copley offered TA the HPLP/Ladenburg block
of stock, but TA declined this offer.32 2 Instead, TA proposed "a threeway transaction. '' 3 1 According to the deal:
TA would buy convertible, interest-bearing debentures in Copley,
and Copley, using the funds injected by TA along with some of its
own cash, would purchase the stock held by HPLP and the
Ladenburg group. The closing of the TA-Copley debenture transacall of the shares comtion was conditioned on Copley's purchasing
34
prising the HPLP-Ladenburg group block.

The TA-Copley deal closed on November 15, 1991.325 Later in November of 1991, the FDA approved two Abbreviated New Drug Applications from Copley.32 6 In April 1992, Copley filed a registration
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 20.
No. Civ. 93-2655, 1995 WL 606272 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1995).
Id. at *1.

315. Id.

316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. "A cold call is the practice of making unsolicited calls to potential customers by brokers. Brokers hope to interest customers in stocks, bonds, mutual funds,
financial planning, or other financial products or services in their cold calls." Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms 93 (John Downes & Jordan Elliot Goodman
eds., 4th ed. 1995).
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at *2.
326. Id. at *2 n.4.
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statement with the SEC.327 Subsequently, in October 1992, Copley
made an initial public offering of its stock.3 s On March 29, 1993,
Herbert Hochberg, an investment banker for Landenburg who had
helped Moroney on the Copley sale, "notified plaintiffs that
Ladenburg believed that Copley had provided Ladenburg with false
and misleading information about Copley's financial condition and future prospects prior to closing. '329 Plaintiffs alleged that Ladenburg
acted recklessly by failing to obtain accurate and relevant information
about Copley prior to their investment in the stock.330
The Plymack court recognized that pleading recklessness was one
way to meet the scienter requirement for securities fraud cases.331
The court noted, however, that a "claim premised on recklessness
[could not] stand where plaintiffs [had] not established facts leading to
an inference of wilful [sic] blindness, and, in particular, where defendant had no apparent motive 'for deliberately shutting [its] eyes' to the
truth. ' 332 Although the plaintiffs alleged that there had been "storm
warnings" that Ladenburg should have seen with regard to information Copley gave Ladenburg,3 3 3 the court believed that the plaintiffs'
claims were merely "allegation[s] of recklessness," insufficient to constitute scienter.3 4
CONCLUSION

In passing the PSLRA, Congress properly decided to resolve the
unsettled nature of 10b-5 pleading and strike a balance between meritorious and frivolous fraud suits. Despite these worthwhile goals, the
standard Congress instated is shrouded in ambiguity. Although the
statute's text and history compel the conclusion that the PSLRA's
pleading standard is more stringent than the prior Second Circuit test,
the exact standard specified remains unclear. It is thus Congress's
job-the job of the policy-making organ of the federal governmentto implement a new 10b-5 pleading standard. The Second Circuit's
test (and expertise) should be adopted by Congress because it strikes
the best balance between strike and meritorious suits and implements
a uniform, well tested pleading standard.

327. Id. at *2.
328. Id
329. Id
330. Id. at *5.
331. Id at *6.
332. Id. (last alteration in the original) (quoting In re Fischbach Corp. Sec. Litig.,
No. Civ. 89-5826, 1992 WL 8715, at *3, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1992)).
333. Id.
334. Id.
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